

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

NAJMA IBN TALAL,

Plaintiff,

-against-

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK  
COUNTY, ET AL.,

Defendants.

22-CV-1476 (LTS)

TRANSFER ORDER

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, who is a resident of Brentwood, Suffolk County, New York, brings this *pro se* action alleging that Defendants violated her federal constitutional rights in Suffolk County, New York. The Court construes the complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. Named as Defendants are the Supreme Court of New York County, the Town of Islip, Brentwood Free School District, Suffolk County Police Department, Good Samaritan Hospital, Brentwood Health Clinic, Marian F. Ejaz, MD, Beautiful Dental, Sandras Fernandez, Apple, Inc., and Amazon.com, Inc. For the following reasons, this action is transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.

**DISCUSSION**

Under the general venue provision, a civil action may be brought in:

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . . ; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

28 U.S.C. § 1331(b). For venue purposes, a “natural person” resides in the district where the person is domiciled, and an “entity with the capacity to sue and be sued,” including a

corporation, resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1), (2). Where a state has more than one judicial district, a defendant corporation generally “shall be deemed to reside in any district in that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d).<sup>1</sup>

Plaintiff filed this complaint regarding events substantially occurring in Suffolk County, New York, which is located in the Eastern District of New York. Because Plaintiff alleges that a substantial part of the events or omissions underlying her claims arose outside this District, venue does not appear to be proper in this District under Section 1391(b)(2).

Plaintiff provides Suffolk County, New York, addresses for all defendants except Apple, for which she provides a Cupertino, California, address, and Amazon, for which she provides a New York, New York, address. (*See* ECF 2-1, at 1.) Plaintiff does not provide an address for the Supreme Court of New York County, although the Court presumes it resides in this District.<sup>2</sup> Amazon and Apple arguably reside in this District and the Eastern District of New York, as their contacts would likely be sufficient to subject them to the Court’s personal jurisdiction. Venue therefore may be proper in this District under Section 1391(b)(1).

Even though venue may proper here, however, the Court may transfer claims “[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

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<sup>1</sup> In a state with multiple districts, if there is no such district, “the corporation shall be deemed to reside in the district within which it has the most significant contacts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d).

<sup>2</sup> The Court notes that the complaint does not allege any facts suggesting how the New York State Supreme Court, New York County, violated Plaintiff’s rights. Moreover, any constitutional claims Plaintiff is attempting to assert against the state court are likely barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

“District courts have broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis.” *D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener*, 462 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2006). Moreover, courts may transfer cases on their own initiative. *See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Wilmington Trust FSB*, 943 F. Supp. 2d 417, 426-427 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Courts have an independent institutional concern to see to it that the burdens of litigation that is unrelated to the forum that a party chooses are not imposed unreasonably on jurors and judges who have enough to do in determining cases that are appropriately before them. The power of district courts to transfer cases under Section 1404(a) *sua sponte* therefore is well established.” (quoting *Cento v. Pearl Arts & Craft Supply Inc.*, No. 03-CV-2424, 2003 WL 1960595, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2003)); *see also Lead Indus. Ass’n. Inc. v. OSHA.*, 610 F.2d 70, 79 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting that “broad language of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) would seem to permit a court to order transfer *sua sponte*”).

In determining whether transfer is appropriate, courts consider the following factors: (1) the convenience of witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the locus of operative facts; (4) the availability of process to compel the attendance of the unwilling witnesses; (5) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) the forum’s familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded to the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (9) trial efficiency; and (10) the interest of justice, based on the totality of circumstances. *Keitt v. N.Y. City*, 882 F. Supp. 2d 412, 459-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); *see also N.Y. Marine and Gen. Ins. Co. v. LaFarge No. Am., Inc.*, 599 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (setting forth similar factors). A plaintiff’s choice of forum is accorded less deference where plaintiff does not reside in the chosen forum and the operative events did not occur there. *See Iragorri v. United Tech. Corp.*, 274 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2001).

Under Section 1404(a), transfer appears to be appropriate in this case. The underlying events occurred in Suffolk County, New York, where Plaintiff and most of the defendants reside, and where witnesses and evidence are likely located. Suffolk County is located within the Eastern District of New York. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 112(c). Venue is therefore proper in the Eastern District of New York. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Court concludes that it is in the interest of justice to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

### **CONCLUSION**

The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court. A summons shall not issue from this Court. This order closes this case.

The Court certifies, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore *in forma pauperis* status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. *See Coppededge v. United States*, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

The Clerk of Court is further directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff and note service on the docket.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 24, 2022  
New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain  
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN  
Chief United States District Judge